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The socio-economic impact of Brexit on CANZUK and 
the Anglosphere in times of Corona :  
The case of Canada, Australia and New Zealand  
 
Dirk Kohnert 1 
 
  
‘Britannia as Miss Havisham’ 
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Source: The Guardian / Olusoga, 2017  
 
Abstract: Although Britain has been one of the hardest hit among the EU member states by the 
corona pandemic, Boris Johnson left the EU at the end of 2020. Brexit supporters endorsed the 
idea of CANZUK, i.e. a union between the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The 
CANZUK was embedded in a vision of the revival of the olden days of Great Britain and its 
role in the ‘Anglosphere’, dating back to World War II and 19th-century British settler 
colonialism. It is rather doubtful whether the CANZUK members can realize Boris Johnson’s 
vision of prosperous trade in the ‘Anglosphere’. Besides, there are many open questions, 
notably on the overall effect of Brexit on CANZUK concerning the socio-economic impact of 
the global Corona crisis. Last, but not least, will the relative weight of the UK vis à vis other 
global players like China and India diminish in the medium and long run. After all, the new 
global focus of international trade will be reallocated from the Atlantic (America and Europe) to 
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 Cartoon by Dominic McKenzie, satirizing concepts of the ‚Anglosphere‘ and CANZUK. Dom McKenzie is an 
internationally renowned artist and cartoonist. Miss Havisham is a legendary character in Charles Dicken‘s novel 
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On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union ended 47 
years after it joined, as administered by the withdrawal agreement signed on January 24, 
2020. The agreement provided for a transition period until December 31, 2020, to renegotiate 
the long-term relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU). 
According to the most recent figures of the British Central Statistical Office (CSO), the Brexit 
caused a substantial plunge in EU-UK trade, falling by 23.1 % compared to the first quarter of 
2018, the last quarter that had been relatively stable before Brexit and the Corona crisis. At 
the same time, China replaced Germany as UK’s biggest single import market. UK’s goods 
imports from China increased by 66 % since 2018 to £ 16.9 bn in the first quarter of 2021, 
whereas UK imports from Germany fell to £ 12.5 bn. Till then, Germany had been the UK’s 
most prominent import market. The fact, that UK’s trade with countries outside the EU fell by 
just 0.8 % over the same period, indicated that most of the decrease was due to the impact of 
Brexit and not the COVID-19 pandemic (Partington, 2021).  
 
Graph 1: Post-Brexit UK trade in goods with non-EU countries surpassed that with EU,  
1
st
 quarter 2021  
 
 
Source: The Guardian, Partington, 2021  
 
Brexiteer arguments, as well as Corona-ideologists reasoning, centred on fantasies about 
British supremacy in matters of international trade (Brexit) and its scientific and inventive 
genius to cope with the pandemic. Both with lots of allusions to the Second World War. 
However, the wartime analogy was deeply misleading because Brexit involved the breaking 
up of the regulatory and customs market and would open the British market not only to 
European producers but to those from all over the ‘Anglosphere’. The mythical picture of 
British superior innovative capacity applied also to Brexiteer arguments that hinge on the 
UK’s supposed leadership in creativity and innovation (Edgerton, 2020), as well as the notion 
that the British had no need of Europeans, or that at least “they need us more than we need 
them” (English, 2020). On the contrary, Brexit could wreck the UK's chance of leading 
Covid-19 global research. Nobel scientists, like Sir Andre Geim at Manchester University, 
warned that Britain will lose ‘superpower’ status if access would be barred to the EU’s € 100 
bn (£85 bn) research funding scheme, Horizon Europe, which will run from 2021 to 2027. 
Since the start of the current EU scheme, Horizon 2020 (which will be succeeded by Horizon 
Europe), the UK has received more than £ 1.5 bn in ERC income and £ 776 m in MSCA 
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(Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions) grants – more than any other EU country, and a fifth of the 
total (Helm & McKie, 2020).  
 
Map 1: The CANZUK trade bloc: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK 
 
  
Source: Deutsche Welle, Martin, 2020  
 
To return to the Brexit question, it is still open to question whether Britain’s pious wishes 
concerning the replacement of the EU internal market by extended links to its former 
Commonwealth and US markets will realise. London itself was rather cautious. It estimated in 
early March 2020 that for example enhanced bilateral trade with the US could result in rather 
modest prosperity, by its own GDP increasing between 0.07% and 0.16%, but only after 
around 15 years. But still, the United States was only the second-largest British trading 
partner after the EU. Moreover, the British government has been up to date opposed to 
American wishes, like a complete opening of agriculture for American investors and access to 
Britain’s cherished National Health Service (NHS) for US pharmaceutical manufacturers 
(Triebe, 2020). Whether London's ambitions concerning the opening-up of markets in its 
former ‘white dominions’ of the three CANZUK states (beside GB), i.e. Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, will be more promising, is even more doubtful, because these former 
colonies have their own agenda which does not necessarily match with that of the UK.  
 
The CANZUK union conception was first coined by William David McIntyre (1966: 339), a 
New Zealand historian, in 1966 as an approach to counter the USA on more equal terms. But 
the proposal gained momentum only with the Brexit vote in 2016 (Lui, 2021). The concept 
was backed mainly by British and Canadian conservatives. Member countries share many 
political, economic and cultural similarities. Thus, English is their official language, they 
practice democratic ways of life, based on the Westminster parliamentary system, and they 
belong to the industrialized, high-income countries. CANZUK countries combined trade 
amounts to about £ 2.5 trillion, and their joined GDP and National Wealth ranking would be 
3rd worldwide (Lui, 2021; CANZUK, Wikipedia). Advocates saw CANZUK already as the 
second most powerful geopolitical union in the world behind the EU, including three of the 
world’s top 15 economies (UK, CA, AUS). They believed the pact would have the potential 
to become an alliance bound together by trade, migration, and security ties (Gamble, 2021). 
Supporters hold that CANZUK would quite possibly become the fourth-largest economic 
power behind China and include more than 136 million people. Moreover, the block would 
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have the world's largest landmass and therefore a rich (potential) reservoir of natural 
resources (Martin, 2020).  
 
Table 1: UK exports, 2019, in billion pounds 
 
  
Source: Deutsche Welle, Martin, 2020  
 
However, economist like Iain Begg from the European Institute at the London School of 
Economics, cautioned that the new trade deal with Brussels might cost the UK a GDP cut by 
5 % over the next 15 years and that CANZUK could in no way compensate for EU market 
access. Before Brexit, the EU was the largest UK trading partner, accounting for 47 % of 
Britain's total trade, whereas Canada, Australia and New Zealand together accounted for just 
3.5%. Moreover, the long distance between CANZUK member states would c.p. increase the 
cost of trade, compared to neighbouring EU states. The economic gravity equation for trade, 
which postulates that the amount of trade depends positively on the size of two countries’ 
economies, but negatively on the distance between them, implies that even if the UK could 
get similar trade terms with CANZUK members as it had as part of the EU customs union 
with common external tariffs, this would be of far less value to the UK, not the least, because 
of non-tariff frictions (Krugman, 2018).  
 
To give an example, I. Begg pointed at the EU automotive industry, where components of 
finished cars exported from the UK crossed borders six or seven times in the process of 
manufacturing, which would be more costly at very long distances (Martin, 2020). Last, but 
not least, the increasing rivalry between China and other Asian countries like Australia could 
weaken the prospects of CANZUK seriously by countering the rules-based international order 
and trade regimes. Recently Beijing punished for example Australia because of Canberra's 
call for an inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic with a ban on Australian 
imports. Likewise, Beijing threatened Britain with consequences after accusing the country of 
interfering in the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement (Martin, 2020). Finally, controversial 
ethical considerations are to be considered because the ‘Anglosphere’ concept, the base of the 
CANZUK proposal, dates back to Victorian ideals and settler colonialism, related to the so-
called ‘White Dominions’
3
 (Lui, 2021; Olusoga, 2017; Gamble, 2021). However, imperial 
modes of thought are not restricted to Brexiteers. They shaped the views of pro-Europeans, as 
well. Visions of ‘Global Britain’ in general minimise the significance of decolonisation and 
they form a common cultural inheritance of English voters (Saunders, 2020). Also, Brexiteers 
maintained that they did not want an isolated, but an open, global-acting and sovereign Britain 
with its own trade and security deals, like Canada or Australia, and not to be restricted 
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 i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and Apartheid South Africa with their large populations of 
European descent.  
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anymore by EU rules. But the latter are by far less integrated into international trade and 
investment with the EU than GB.  
 
Moreover, the UK share in exports to the Anglosphere’s economies declined steadily since 
the ‘glorious’ colonial times, from 36 % in 1949 to 2.5 % in 2017. The intra-Anglosphere 
trade dropped as well from about two-thirds of total trade in 1947 to one third in 2017 
(Gamble, 2021: 111). Equally, the recent application of London to join the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a grouping of eleven Asian countries 
bordering the Pacific, is met with scepticism, considering that CPTPP countries account for 
less than 10 % of the UK’s exports and the UK-government has already agreements with most 
of these countries. Hence, the net benefit added is doubtful (Ruyter, 2021). Finally, with 
Brexit, Britain's vision of a 'special relationship' with the US, the UK being a bridge between 
Europe and America, becomes less attractive, because Britain's value for the US as a 
significant global player diminishes with the UK leaving the EU (Gamble, 2021:111). 
Therefore, the Governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, maintained recently that the 
economic effect of a no-deal Brexit would be even more severe than the Corona crisis 
(Boscia, 2020; Gamble, 2021:111).  
 
UK companies on the other hand apparently had a more realistic view and seemed to have 
been well aware of the looming risk. They voted already before the Corona crisis with their 
money, sharp tongues would maintain, like rats deserting a sinking ship. However that may 
be, the ‘Leave-vote’ had led British firms already by March 2019 to increase the number of 
UK outward investment transactions in the remaining EU-27 by 17 %, whereas transactions in 
non-EU OECD countries remained unaffected. On the other hand, the number of EU-27 
investment projects in the UK declined only by around 9 %, which suggests that the UK 
would be more exposed to the costs of economic disintegration than the remaining EU 
member states (Breinlich et al 2020). Moreover, the Brexit-related uncertainty led to a loss of 
market value of international firms most exposed to Brexit as well as reduced hiring and 
investments, because international firms overwhelmingly expected negative direct effects 
from Brexit. Especially, firms expected difficulties from regulatory divergence, reduced 
labour mobility, and limited trade access (Hassan et al 2021). 
 
Whether London's ambitions concerning the opening-up of global markets will be more 
promising is even more doubtful because the remaining EU-27 does not lie low.  
 
 
Table 2: cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases per million, 22 May 2021  
 
Country COVID-19 cases COVID-19 death Global rank 4 
UK :  65,938 1885 7 
Canada : 36,127 667 22 
Australia :  29,300 910 121 
New Zealand : 2,662 26 180 
Median:  18,652 351  
Source: D. Kohnert; ourworldindata.org.  
 
Moreover, Britain has been hit by the COVID-19 pandemic far more severe than the other 
CANZUK member states. In November 2020, the UK had to deplore the highest COVID-19 
related death toll in Europe (COVID-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom, Wikipedia). At the 
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 The global ranking is only of limited value because various crucial variables are not considered, including 
climate, population density, GDP per capita, resource availability (including vaccines), infrastructure etc. 
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same time, the British treasury revealed that the country would probably experience the worst 
slump in 300 years due to the impact of the Corona crisis, with GDP decreasing by 11.3 % in 
2020 and an unemployment rate of up to 7.5 % in 2021 (Morales & Goodman, 2020; 
Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK, Wikipedia). Moreover, the COVID-
19 pandemic had severe social, political and cultural implications (Social impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the UK, Wikipedia).  
 





In short, it is already questionable whether the UK will be able to pull itself up by its 
bootstraps out of the Corona crisis after the Brexit-leave without the tried and tested 
cooperation with the EU. Whether Britain, on its own, will have the additional power to assist 
its CANZUK allies to cope not only with the consequences of the corona-pandemic but also 
with the impact of the Brexit is even more unlikely.  
 
Graph 3: Covid-19 outbreak compared, different continents  
number of cases per day, seven day rolling average. Each region on its own scale. 
 
   




In the following sections a more detailed analysis of the combined effects of the Corona 
pandemic and Brexit on CANZUK member states will be given, taking the example of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with special emphasis on the impact on the most 




(1)  Socio-economic impact of the Corona -pandemic on Canada  
When Canada recorded a nation-wide spike in COVID-19 cases, hospitalization and death 
during the second Corona wave, following the Christmas holidays in December 2002 and 
January 2021, heavy restrictions of democratic rights and public activities, including 
lockdowns and curfews, had to be put in place in a way unmatched in Canada’s post-war 
history. At least by now, it became evident how important a basic consensus from all walks of 
life was on the inevitably of these restrictions to contain the pandemic and to protect others.  
 
Fortunately, both Canadian political elites and the general public agreed in a cross-partisan 
consensus on crucial questions related to the Corona pandemic, such as its seriousness and the 
necessity of social distancing (Merkley et al, 2020). This was all the more striking, as in the 
neighbouring US a deep divide between polarized political camps affected also partisan views 
and handling of the crisis with corresponding negative repercussions.  
 
Graph 4: Daily cases and death in Canada, April to Oct. 2020  
  
 
When the report of the Canadian Institute for Health Information, Ottawa, revealed in June 
2020, that the country had the worst record among OECD nations for COVID-19-related 
deaths in long-term care facilities for older people (CIHI 2020), this was considered by many 
Canadians as a “national disgrace” (Webster, 2021). In spring 2020, the army was called in to 
care homes after corona outbreaks in Quebec killed 3,890 residents and caused large numbers 
of staff illnesses and absences. Soldiers delivered basic services to the residents, while 
military physicians delivered medical care. According to experts, this disaster was at least 
partially due to the government's historical decision to exclude long-term care facilities from 
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the country's network of 13 provincial and territorial public health systems and the lack of 
government control, especially in privately owned, profit-oriented, privately owned long-term 
care facilities that accounted for 54 % of all these services (Webster, 2021). 
 
Graph 5: Real GDP, expressed as % of pre-COVID-19 levels, selected service industries  
  
Source: Gellatly & McCormack, 2020  
 
The pandemic impacted seriously on Canada’s economy too, provoking a recession. Yet, 
mass layoffs of workers were largely prevented by the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy. 
Nevertheless, Canada's unemployment rate rose to 13.5 % in May 2020, the highest since 
1976 (Tencer, 2020; COVID-19 pandemic in Canada, Wikipedia). Tourism, accommodation 
and food sectors, as well as air travel, were hit especially hard due to travel restrictions. 44 % 
of Canadian households experienced some type of job loss up to April 2020. Applications for 
emergency benefits due to the pandemic reached 6 million. The Toronto Stock Exchange 
crashed (- 12 % on 12 March 2020), its biggest single-day decline since 1940 (COVID-19 
pandemic in Canada, Wikipedia).  
 
During the lockdown in April 2020, about 88,000 businesses that were operating the month 
before closed. The number of closures slowed to 36,500 in July, comparable to levels 
observed before the pandemic (Gellatly & McCormack, 2020).    
 
Graph 6:  Number of active businesses, year-over-year change, business sector  
 
 




Graph 7: COVID-19 cases by province in Canada  
Source: COVID-19 Canada, April 2021  
 
Regionally, the pandemic concentrated on Ontario, Quebec and Atlanta provinces. During a 
third wave of the virus in March 2021, cases began rising across most provinces west of 
Atlantic Canada, prompting further lockdowns and restrictions in the most populous 
provinces like Ontario and Quebec (COVID-19 pandemic in Canada, Wikipedia). 
 
Map 2: Cumulative COVID-19 cases, Canada, April 2021  
 
  
Source: COVID-19 Canada, per Public Health Units reported, April 2021 
 
Nevertheless, Canadian responses to the corona pandemic were both more rapid and 
comprehensive than those of the United States, at least during the first five month (Béland, 
2020). Later on, Canada compared unfavourably with the neighbouring US, mainly because 
of different progresses in vaccination, although, in all of Canada the spread of coronavirus 
slowed down in April 2021. At this time, Canada was on the verge to surpass the US, in a 
reversal of earlier pandemic trends, in the number of new COVID-19 cases relative to its 




Graph 8: Canada’s Covid management superiority vs. the US is fading fast  
 
  
Source: Blum, 2021, CBC-news, April, 13. 2021  
 
(2) Socio-economic impact of the Brexit on Canada  
‘Brexit will be a titanic success …’ 
  
Source:  Michael de Adder, Canada
5
; Hills, 2016  
 
The UK is Canada’s fifth-largest trading partner in the world. The bilateral merchandise trade 
averaged CA$ 27.1 billion between 2017 and 2019. Thereby, Canada’s trade with the UK was 
greater than its trade with Germany (CA$ 23.9 billion). Merchandise trade between Canada 
and the UK  amounted to 30.1 % of total Canadian trade with the EU before Brexit. Up to this 
time, the EU - the world’s second-largest economy worldwide - was Canada’s third-largest 
trading partner after the United States and China (Government of Canada, 18 May 2021). 
                                                 
5
 Michael de Adder; Twitter @deAdder: Cartoon for June 24, 2016.  Cartoon concerning a press statement of the 
then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson: Brexit will be titanic success, says Boris Johnson, The Guardian,  
November 3, 2016.  
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However, nearly half of the value of UK – Canada’s merchandise trade is in precious metals 
such as gold. If gold would be removed, bilateral trade would drop to CA$ 14.7 billion, which 
equals about the trade between Canada and South Korea (CA$ 14.8 billion). 
 
Moreover, the UK is a key source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and science- and 
technology partnerships with Canada. Also in this respect, the continuation of the application 
of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) of 2017 was 
crucial for continuing free bilateral UK-Canada trade because CETA removed 98 % of the 
pre-existing tariffs between the EU and Canada and over time about 99 % of tariffs on traded 
goods. Furthermore, CETA included additional benefits, such as improved access for services, 
greater certainty and transparency, protection for investments and intellectual property and 
opportunities for Canada in EU procurement markets (Kenigsberg, 2021).   
 
Taking account of Brexit, transitional arrangements applied to UK-Canada trade until the end 
of the Brexit transition period (December 31, 2020). To limit significant potential trade losses 
of up to CA$ 1.6 billion after the EU-UK divorce, the British and Canadian government 
signed (December 9, 2020) and ratified the UK-Canada Trade Continuity Agreement 
(Canada-U.K. TCA), which came into effect on April 1, 2021. It preserved the main benefits 
of CETA, including the elimination of tariffs on 98 % of products. However, in case the TCA 
would not hold, and bilateral goods trade would be limited to the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN; UKGT for the UK tariffs), Canada’s GDP could decline by CA$ 427 million (US$ 
322 million) by 2025, and bilateral trade losses could be CA$ 2 billion (US$1.5 billion). By 
implementing TCA, both countries hopefully avoid these potential GDP and trade losses 
(Government of Canada, 18 May 2021; Free trade agreements of Canada, wikipedia).  
 
Yet, it is open to question whether the rosy predictions of Boris Johnson about the ‘Titanic 
success' of Brexit will come true (Kohnert, 2020a). On the contrary case of a significant 
Brexit induced downturn of Britain, and considering the economic, political and cultural ties 
between the UK and Canada, it could not be excluded that Canada would be affected 
negatively too.  
 
The post-colonial relationship between the two countries, which had shaped Canadian 
perceptions of the EU up to the Brexit vote, is likely to change as well. Like in Britain, the 
Brexit induced fault-line between Canada’s main political parties, the multi-lateral Liberals 
and the more Commonwealth-focused Conservatives, could result in two opposing visions of 
the transatlantic relationship that would be disruptive for Canada’s relations with the EU 
(without Great Britain) as well. This could not only enhance domestic political conflict within 
Canada, including a revival of divisive debates within Canada about the relative importance 
of British and French traditions, but it could also undermine the long-term stability of Canada-
Europe relations (Hurrelmann, 2020, Hurrelmann, 2018). Whether the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement (SPA) between Canada and the EU, which had been agreed upon alongside CETA 
on demand of the EU, will cushion potential economic and non-economic shocks is open to 
question. The SPA has been established to build a closer strategic relationship between the 
EU-27 and a complementary framework of non-economic relations, ranging from climate 
change to scientific cooperation. It focused on strengthening foreign policy coordination and 
addressing global challenges and opportunities, including cooperation concerning reforms of 
international financial market regulations as well as global trade rules inside the WTO system, 
notably to answer self-centred ‘America first' policies (Bendiek, 2018). Latest with the Trump 
government, both Ottawa and Brussels experienced increasing political pressure from 
Washington to open their markets for US products and services. Nevertheless, Ottawa has to 
guard its priorities. Currently, roughly 75 % of Canada’s overall trade is with the US, a 
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percentage that had been even higher (up to 85 %) before the September 11 attack (9/11) in 
the US break and the subsequent reinforcing of American borders since 2001 (Bartels & 
Mestral, 2018).  
 
Moreover, Canada cooperates with the EU and UK in the realm of the security policy of 
NATO. In any case, whereas the EU tended thus far to consider Brexit primarily as an internal 






(1)  Socio-economic impact of the Corona-pandemic on Australia  
‘The monster lurking behind coronavirus  
Remember Brexit? Perhaps it’s time we did’  
  
‘Coronavirus stalks the land’, illustration: Chris Riddell  
Source: The Guardian, 14 Mar 2020  
 
Because Australia had adopted an early public health response to the Corona crisis, limiting 
the transmission of COVID-19 and thus avoiding the levels of acute hospitalization and 
fatalities as in other countries, it was handicapped in other respects. The pandemic arrived at 
the same time as one of the largest bushfire seasons of the country, accompanied by 
subsequent climatic calamities involving drought, cyclones and floods (Shakespeare-Finch, 
2020). As for the Corona crisis, the Australian health service reported end of May 2021 over 
30,000 cases and 900 deaths. Most cases and fatalities had been caused by the second Corona 
wave in Victoria, accounting for about 75 % of total cases and 90 % of deaths (COVID-19 
pandemic in Australia, Wikipedia).  
 
The pandemic affected the Australian economy seriously with widespread loss of 
employment, social dislocation and health hazards across the country. The rate of unemployed 
soared to 7.5 % in July 2020, and only decreased to 5.8 % in May 2021, i.e. about the level 
before the start of the Corona crisis, last, but not least, because of an effective vaccination 
campaign. The export-orientated agricultural sector had been especially affected, not least, 
because of a shortfall of pickers, i.e mostly seasonal migrants from overseas, in the harvest 
season 2020, who could not enter the country because of Corona-related border closures 
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(ibid). Equally negative affected were more than 193,000 freelancers and art workers who 
suffered because most performances had to be cancelled (ibid). As for the Australian stock 
market, there were mixed reactions (Rahmana, et al., 2021). Initially, there were negative 
returns, later on, the stock market reacted positively to the government's stimulus packages, 
notably the "Job Keeper" package. The smallest, least profitable and value portfolios suffered 
most during the pandemic. Besides, size and liquidity were significant drivers of abnormal 
returns (Rahmana, et al., 2021).  
According to preliminary evidence, psychological distress, morbidity and risk of suicide 
resulting from the Corona crisis increased significantly, as well as the mental health risk 
arising from increased sedentary comportment with the introduction of lockdown, physical 
distancing measures, changes in household structure, and significant uncertainty about the 
future (Shakespeare-Finch, Jane et al, 2020; Biddle et al., 2020; O’Sullivan & Rahamathulla 
& Pawar, 2020). Other studies revealed the rise in domestic work burdens for women who 
carried most of the extra unpaid workload, although men’s childcare time increased more in 
relative terms. So the average gender-equality gap narrowed, although the relative gap in 
housework remained. In general, the lockdown increased dissatisfaction with the balance of 
paid and unpaid work on a much higher base for women (Lyn & Churchill, 2021). 
 
Map 3: COVID-19 cases by state or territory, 1 October 1 2020  
  
Source: COVID-19 pandemic in Australia, Wikipedia. 
 
Because the COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan (China), the crisis was accompanied - 
as in other, particularly Asian countries - by a deplorable side-effect. Xenophobia and 
prejudice against members of the Chinese-Australian and Asian-Australian communities 
increased substantially, notably in the social media but also in daily papers, like the 
Melbourne’s Herald Sun and Sydney's Daily Telegraph. Chinese restaurants in Sydney and 
Melbourne recorded a drastic drop in business, with trade declining by more than 70 %. 
According to a survey of the Australian National University (ANU), 84.5 % of Asian-
Australians faced discrimination between January and October 2020, although the study 
found Asian-Australians even more anxious about COVID-19 than other fellow citizens 




Yet, the Corona crisis also procured positive side-effects, at least initially, like greater 
confidence of the people in government and the public service and large improvements in 
social trust (Biddle et al., 2020). About 80 % of respondents of a representative enquiry 
agreed that their government in Canberra was generally trustworthy, a substantial increase 
from a similar study in 2009 (Goldfinch et al., 2021). Besides other factors, this was due to 
the government’s management of the Covid-19 pandemic, not least, transfers especially for 
lower income levels, with the effect that these strata were less likely to find it difficult to cope 
with their income. Economically the most affected social groups were the relatively young 
(aged 18 to 24) and those just beyond retirement age (aged 65 to 74 years) because both 
groups recorded the biggest income loss. They were the least likely to have maintained their 
employment (Biddle et al., 2020). Yet, in terms of subjective wellbeing, the younger 
generation (18 to 24 years) had to bear the brunt of the cost of the crisis. Particularly, young 
women were exposed to the economic impact of the pandemic, especially those women, 
wanting more work and more working hours. Thus, the Corona crisis threatened to erode 
some of the participation gains of women made in recent decades (Churchill, 2020). The life 
satisfaction of the young generation, in general, decreased on average more than three times 
than that of the older generation (65 to 74 years), whereas the life satisfaction of persons 
above 75 years actually increased (Biddle et al., 2020: 27).  
 
 
(2)  Socio-economic impact of the Brexit on Australia  
 
‚Don't even think about it!‘  
 
Cartoon, credit: Peter Brookman, Australia; Hills, 2016  
 
Shortly after the UK-Brexit vote 2016, Canberra was among the first Commonwealth 
members to propose a post-Brexit free-trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand, 
including additional immigration accords as well as a customs union with the CANZUK 
member state (Catalano, 2016). Both former British colonies share a common heritage, 
history, values and security arrangements. However, they adhere to different perceptions of 
the EU because of diverse geopolitical perspectives (Kelly & Mochan, 2020). When the UK 
joined the EU, both countries entertained feelings of betrayal and abandonment vis à vis their 
'mother country'. However, whereas New Zealand viewed Brexit rather sceptical, Australians, 
in general, looked forward to new and promising foreign- and trade relations. Only the 
Australian elite had a more positive view of the EU (Kelly & Mochan, 2020). Britain is 
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Australia's seventh, and New Zealand sixth-largest trading partner, behind China and the EU-
27. The primary sector, notably agriculture, is among the most contested issues because the 
countries lost their privileged access to the UK market when Britain joined the ECC in 1973 
(Hurst & Graham-McLay, 2020). Moreover, post-Brexit UK talks were paralleled by 
simultaneous negotiations of a new trade agreement with the remaining EU-27, Australia's 
third-largest trading partner. First UK-Australian negotiations were to begin on 29 June 2020, 
but they had to be postponed due to Covid-19 restrictions.  
 
Mid May 2021, London apparently offered Australia a post-Brexit trade deal, including a 
transition to zero quotas and tariffs over 15 years, although discussions are still taking place 
(Walker, 2021). This was seen as a victory by free-trade favourable Brexiteers. At the same, 
however, the deal prompted alarm among British farmers, who were worried, e.g. about 
prospects that large-scale Australian beef and lamb exports could undercut their prices. 
Britain's National Farmers’ Union (NFU) warned already that post-Brexit trade deals could 
cause “irreversible damage” to British farmers. Before Brexit, the British agricultural sector 
had been protected by the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), including agricultural 
subsidies and other shielding programmes introduced since 1962. Till then, CAP treated 
British production preferentially at the expense of Australian and New Zealand food imports. 
London announced already that former EU-subsides to the tune of € 3 Mrd. would be 
curtailed and even eliminated completely in the coming years. Instead of fixed subsidies per 
hectare, future subsidies of London would be linked to the farmer's contribution to 
environment-, landscape- and animal protection (Plickert, 2021). Whether the former EU 
preferential treatment will continue after Brexit depends largely on the political pressure the 
British agriculture lobby can exert on the London government (Abbott, 2019). Moreover, the 
British international trade secretary, Liz Truss, promised that the new British-Australian trade 
agreement could be a first step to the entry into a free-trade deal with the eleven member 
countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP), among them Japan, Canada, Mexico, Vietnam, Singapur and Malaysia, and 
therewith open-up Asian markets for British farmers (Plickert, 2021). The UK-Australian deal 
could be considered as a model because it would be the first really new post-Brexit deal, 
rather than a roll-over of those formerly made when Britain still was a part of the EU (Walker, 
2021).  
 
Yet, it should be remembered that the British economy is about twice the size of that of 
Australia and New Zealand combined. Therefore, British trade has traditionally been of 
greater importance to that of New Zealand and Australia than the reverse, with evident 
repercussions on the relative bargaining position (Abbott, 2019). On the other hand, 
Australian and New Zealand trade is nowadays mainly with the economies of the Asia-Pacific 
region. Much of their exports to the UK are still of resource- and agricultural-intensive goods. 
Moreover, Australia's merchandise goods exports are mainly directed to China, followed by 
Korea, Japan, the United States, India and New Zealand. Australian imports come mainly 
from China, Germany, Korea, Japan and the United States. New Zealand's foreign trade 
structure is similar, including China, Germany, Australia, Japan and the US as well. Australia 
and New Zealand, both have free trade agreements with China and South Korea, and both are 
members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, agreements that neither the EU nor the UK has 
(Abbott, 2019:12). Besides, the trade in services between the three countries is more 
prominent than in other countries. Australians' services trade with the UK is even more 
important than trade in merchandise goods. Therefore, post-Brexit trade negotiations will 
probably focus on service trade as well. Finally, investment flows between the three countries 
are important, Britain being the second biggest overseas investor in the other two countries 
(Abbott, 2019: 13-14).     
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New Zealand  
 
(1)  Socio-economic impact of Corona-pandemic on New Zealand   
Living with the pandemic – Is Donald Trump right when he says,  
“It’s all over for New Zealand”?  
  
Cartoon: Guy Body New Zealand Herald, 24 August 2020. 
Source: Wood & Lockley, 2020  
 
In May, and again in early September 2020, the WHO praised New Zealand, beside 
Cambodia, Japan, South Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, and Vietnam, for its "very 
systematic" response to the Covid-19 crisis (tvzn, 2020). Actually, New Zealand is one of the 
countries at the very bottom (rank 180) of the global country-list of Corona affected states. 
However, this evaluation is only of limited value because various crucial variables are 
apparently not considered, including climate, population density, GDP per capita, resource 
availability (including vaccines), infrastructure etc. Nevertheless, up to now, the country got 
off lightly from the Corona crisis. On May 21, 2021, it counted a total of 2,306 confirmed 
cases and altogether 26 deaths. The pandemic had peaked in April 2020.  
 
Up to September 2020, New Zealand’s economy had to recognize a recession, due to the 
Corona crisis and subsequent nationwide lockdowns etc., with a drop of GDP by 12.2 % in 
the June reporting quarter. (COVID-19 pandemic in New Zealand, wikipedia). However, after 
the government apparently succeded in containing the pandemic, the countries economy 
recovered at the end of 2020 with a growth of +0.4% instead of the expected -1.7 % decrease. 
Unemployment fell slightly as well from a peak 5.3 % in September 2020 to 4.9 % in 
December (Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in NZ, Wikipedia).  
 
Moreover, the Corona crisis had serious social, political and cultural impacts on the country, 
including education and migration. Thus, all schools, early childhood centres and universities 







Map 4: COVID-19 cases per million, New Zealand; May 2021  
 
  
Source:  COVID-19 pandemic in New Zealand, wikipedia 
 
In contrast to the US, public confidence in the government was considerable throughout the 
pandemic. An opinion poll in February 2021 revealed that 79 % of respondents rated the 
government's actions to contain the Corona crisis as "excellent" or "good" (COVID-19 
pandemic in New Zealand, wikipedia).  
 
Graph 9: Divergent public satisfaction over Corona: US vs. NZ  
  
Source: Wood & Lockley, 2020  
 
According to public perception, the corona pandemic in New Zealand is largely confined. 
Only 19 active cases were counted on May 16, 2021, all of them due to entries from abroad. 
During about one year, those who entered the country had to go in quarantine for 14 days at 
their own costs, except Australian citizens, because there the Corona incidence was also low. 
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Surprisingly, conspiracy theories about the virus flourished nevertheless in New Zealand, 
especially in the music and esoteric scene (Richter, 2021). Strong lobby groups rebelled 
against effective Covid-19 measures (Richter, 2021). To counter these conspiracy ideologies, 
a network of activist founded the organization 'Fight Against Conspiracy Theories’ (FACT) to 
oppose COVID-19 misinformation, as promoting anti-vaccine and anti-mask protests by 
conspiracy groups like QAnon, 'Covid Plan B' and ‘Voices for Freedom’ (VFF). The latter 
was led by Clair Deeks, a New Zealand anti-vaccine activist who was an unsuccessful 
candidate for the conspiracist Advance NZ in the country's general election in 2020.  
 
 
(2)  Socio-economic impact of the Brexit on New Zealand  
 




Source: N.A., 2017. The Economist, February 11, 2017  
 
Because of the close political, economic and cultural relationship between Australia and New 
Zealand, much of the analysis of the socio-economic impact of Brexit on Australia applies 
also to New Zealand. Therefore, the following focuses on the additional impact on New 
Zealand.  
 
New Zealand's sixth-largest trading partner is the UK, with bilateral trade totalling almost 
NZ$ 6 bn in 2019. But China, Australia and the EU are on top of the countries foreign trade 
relations (Hurst & Graham-McLay, 2020).  
 
In early January 2021, a favourable report, urging the government in Wellington to join the 
CANZUK, was submitted after it gained 82 % of votes at an opinion poll (Ferguson, 2021). 
Besides, CANZUK International, an international advocacy organisation based in Vancouver 
(Canada), proposed two complementary but separate treaties: one for freedom of movement 
and another for free trade. In the free movement (migration) arrangement it was proposed to 
the UK and Canada to join the already existing Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA) of 
1973, which allows the citizens of member states (Australia and New Zealand) to travel more 
                                                 
6
 Cartoon of David Simonds, referring to the traumatic experience of New Zealand with the British access to the 
EEC in 1961, with devasting consequences for New Zealand's exports to the UK.  
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easily, to reside and work in the other country, though with some restrictions. The TTTA was 
based on earlier agreements, like the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement (1966), 
the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA, 
2013), said to be one of the most comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements in existence, 
including the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade by harmonizing food standards 
(Ferguson, 2021), and the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (1998) (Trans-
Tasman Travel Arrangement, wikipedia). According to New Zealand’s trade minister, David 
Parker, the new proposed FTA would not only remove tariffs but also include new approaches 
to non-tariff barriers, streamlined customs, development of digital trade and trade provisions 
in support of sustainable environmental development (Hurst & Graham-McLay, 2020). 
However, New Zealand’s trading links with its Asian neighbours, like China, Australia and 
other members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC, founded in 1992), 
improved substantially since the UK reduced its foreign trade with New Zealand when the 
UK joined the EU. Now New Zealand's trade with the APEC accounts for 72 % of its exports. 
 
Graph 10: Change of NZ goods exports by destination, 1960 to 2015  
  
Source: N.A., 2017. The Economist, February 11, 2017  
 
Proponents of CANZUK often underline that the new trade deal could help to keep China and 
its assertions for supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region in check. However, this is doubtful, 
given the dependency of both Australia and New Zealand that are trading mainly in fossil and 







Conclusion   
 
Although the Brexit vote divided not only British voters but also the political class and 
general public in its former ‘white dominions’, the divorce from the EU corresponded to a 
still popular nostalgia for the revival of the British Empire. This time hopefully in a win-win 
partnership and on eye level. The CANZUK agreement was seen by many as an important 
step to realize the supposed ‘titanic success’ that the Brexit vote promised – often with false 
assertions – to the English voters.  
 
Despite the still close political, economic and cultural links, not least the common language, 
things advanced and time went by. Canada as well as Australia and New Zealand successfully 
adapted their economies to the requirement of the new global division of labour. Therefore, 
their goals will be difficult to reconcile with that of the British Brexiteers and the chances for 
a net gain for all concerned are rather slim (Olusoga, 2017; Ruyter, 2021).  
 
Finally, also within the realm of climate policy and environmental protection, the ambitious 
British goals are hardly compatible with that of Australia and New Zealand. Whereas the UK 
ranks high in climate protection, aming at net-zero emissions by 2050 which is actually 
included in respective laws, Australia has not even set a federal net-zero emissions goal, nor a 
carbon price (Lui, 2021). This may be explained by the high dependence of Australian exports 
on fossil fuel, constituting hitherto about 50 % of its exports. Australia has just been through a 
mining boom that reminds of the 19th-century gold rush (Olusoga, 2017). The same holds for 
Canada with its high dependency on petroleum and fossil fuel products. On the other hand, 
New Zealand's Zero Carbon Act, also aiming at net-zero emissions by 2050, that Wellington 
had passed shortly after the UK, sounds likewise ambitious. However, emissions from 
agriculture and waste, which represent 40 % of New Zealand's current emissions, were 
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Résumè: Bien que la Grande-Bretagne ait été l'un des États membres les plus durement 
touchés par la COVID-19 pandémie, Boris Johnson a quitté l'UE fin 2020. Les partisans du 
Brexit ont approuvé l'idée de CANZUK, c'est-à-dire, une union entre le Royaume-Uni, le 
Canada, l'Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande. Le CANZUK s’inscrivait dans une vision de la 
renaissance des anciens temps de la Grande-Bretagne et de son rôle dans « l ’Anglosphère », 
datant de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et du colonialisme des colons britanniques du XIXe 
siècle. Il est assez douteux que les membres de CANZUK puissent revaloriser la vision de 
Boris Johnson d’un commerce prospère dans « l’Anglosphère ». En outre, de nombreuses 
questions restent ouverts, notamment sur l'effet global du Brexit sur CANZUK par rapport à 
l'impact socio-économique de la COVID-19 crise mondiale. Enfin, le poids relatif du 
Royaume-Uni par rapport à d'autres acteurs mondiaux, comme la Chine et l'Inde, diminuera à 
moyen et long terme. Après tout, la nouvelle orientation mondiale du commerce international 
sera réaffectée de l'Atlantique (Amérique et Europe) à la région Asie-Pacifique, l'acteur clé de 
l’économie mondiale à venir. 
 
Zusammenfassung: Obwohl Großbritannien von der Corona Ppandemie unter den EU-
Mitgliedstaaten mit am stärksten betroffen war, verließ Boris Johnson die EU Ende 2020. Die 
Befürworter des Brexit unterstützten die Idee eines CANZUK Handelsvertrages, d.h. einer 
Union zwischen Großbritannien, Kanada, Australien und Australien Neuseeland. CANZUK 
war eingebettet in eine Vision der Wiederbelebung der alten Tage Großbritanniens und seiner 
Rolle in der „Anglosphäre“, die auf den Zweiten Weltkrieg und den britischen 
Siedlerkolonialismus des 19. Jahrhunderts zurückgeht. Es ist zweifelhaft, ob die CANZUK-
Mitglieder Boris Johnsons Vision eines prosperierenden Handels in der „Anglosphäre“ 
umsetzen können. Außerdem gibt es viele offene Fragen, insbesondere zu den Gesamteffekten 
des Brexit auf CANZUK angesichts der sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen der globalen 
Corona-Krise. Nicht zuletzt, wird das relative Gewicht Großbritanniens gegenüber anderen 
Global Playern wie China und Indien mittel- und langfristig abnehmen. Schließlich wird sichh 
der globale Schwerpunkt des internationalen Handels vom Atlantik (Amerika und Europa) auf 
den asiatisch-pazifischen Raum verlagern, dem Hauptakteur der zukünftigen Weltwirtschaft. 
 
